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NOTES TOWARD A HISTORY OF AMERICAN JUSTICE*
LAWRRENCE M. FRIEDMAN**

n Kent County, Delaware, in 1703, Adam Latham, a laborer, and
Joan Mills, wife of a laborer named Andrew Mills, were brought
before the county court. The grand jury presented Joan Mills for
adultery. She pleaded guilty to the charge. For punishment, the court
ordered her to be publicly whipped-21 lashes on her bare back, well
applied; and she was also sentenced to prison, at hard labor, for one
year. Adam Latham was convicted of fornication. He was sentenced
to receive 20 lashes on his bare back, well laid on, in full public view.
He was also accused of stealing Isaac Freeland's dark brown gelding,
worth 2 pounds 10 shillings. Adam pleaded guilty; for this crime he
was sentenced to another four lashes, and was further required to pay
for the gelding. Adam had been in trouble over Joan Mills before,
charged with "the Sin of Incontinency and fornication." At that time,
he was acquitted, but the court ordered him to post bond guaranteeing
"good behavior." He had broken his word. Now he was ordered to
"weare a Roman T on his left arme on the Outside of his uppermost
garment . . . for the space of six months next." 1 These were typical

crimes and punishments in colonial America. Published colonial
records show hundreds of similar examples.2
We note the tremendous stress on visibility. The whipping post,
pillory, and stocks stood in the public square. They did not gather
dust. Countless men and women felt the whip, or stood in the stocks.
*This article is adapted from the Mitchell Lecture delivered by the. author at the
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law on -October 17, 1973. The author
wishes to thank Professor Marc Galanter of the Buffalo School of Law for his helpful
criticisms.
I
**Professor of Law, Stanford University, Stanford, California. J.D., University of
Chicago, 1951; M.LL., 1953.
1. COURT RECORDS OF KENT COUNTY, DELAWARE 1680-1705, at 234-35, 270-71
(L. de Valinger ed. 1959).
2. The trial of Joan Mills and Adam Latham did deviate somewhat from the norm
in that a prison sentence was imposed. Colonial society did not, in general, make use
of prisons in this way. Society needed- workers; a man in jail was not a productive hand.
The colonists used jails to detain people waiting for trial or for sentence, or to hold
those who did not pay their debts. Whipping, branding, fines, and the stocks were far
more common. D. ROTHMAN, THE DisCOVERY OF THE ASYLUm 53 (1971).
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When Christopher Lawson, of York County, Maine, came into court
"unsevelly," with a "turbilent beheaviouer," in July, 1669, he was
forthwith "comited to sitt on ower in the stockes." 3 In the same
volume of records we read about Sarah Morgan, who struck her husband, horror of horrors, and was given the choice of paying a fine or
standing for a half hour at Kittery, at a public town meeting, with
a gag in her mouth and "the cause of her offence writt upon her forhead."' 4 The law made common use of brands and badges of shame.
A' burglar, under the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1648),
was to be "branded on the forehead with the letter (B)." A second
offender Would be "branded as before," and whipped. The third offender would be "put to death, as being incorrigible.", Colonies made
liberal use of devices such as the bilbo, the cucking stool, and, for
military offenders, the wooden 'horse-all of which carried stigma
and shame.
It is commonplace that social forces produce law, directly and
indirectly. It follows that different cultures will make law in different
ways. In every society there are the rulers and the ruled; some individuals, groups and strata have more power or influence than others;
the' law that any society makes will reflect the interests of those on
top, to the extent of their superior might. But power and influence
do not directly act on law. Law-statutes, doctrines, legal behavior
in .general-comes about only when individuals and groups make
demands on the system. Demands then, rather than interests, are the
proximate causes of law. The structure of demands is a cultural factor; no doubt its shape always reveals the powerful pull of long-term
pressures, deriving from those with influence and power. But one cannot deduce the catalog of demands current in society directly from
a knowledge of the real, objective needs of those with power, actual
and potential. Every society rests on a set of implicit bargains about
the legitimate limits of law; in every society a set of important attitudes support these bargains.
In every era, we want to ask: what forces had power, real and
potential; what were their interests; and what were their demands?
These demands need not be solely economic in nature. Power is not
3. 2 PROVINCE
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solely economic. Distinct and important are the demands for the
maintenance of moral hegemony--demands for a monopoly of respectability, in short, for legitimacy.
We will analyze, in a much oversimplified scheme, three periods
of American history in terms of these simple propositions. The three
periods are: colonial America, the first two-thirds of the 19th century,
and the period from about 1870 to the present. There is nothing neat
about these "periods." They do seem, however, to reflect differences
in prevailing frames of mind.
We began with colonial America. We cannot sum this period
up, of course, in a single glib formula. There were more than a
dozen separate "colonies," and the colonial "era" spanned a century
and a half. But for much of this period the rulers, particularly in
New England, had a clear idea of what crime meant. Crime was a
kind of sin. Society's leaders did not easily abandon hope for the
sinner. These were, in the main, small societies; they believed, rightly
or wrongly, in repentence and rehabilitation. Except for the most
hardened and abandoned cases, it was thought that men could respond
to pressure and improve their way of life if they were instructed in
proper behavior, punished for wrong conduct, subjected to shame and
derision from their neighbors, and stigmatized when they strayed from
the straight and narrow path. This is the reason why punishment
was so open, so public. The man who was whipped in view of everyone was receiving physical punishment; but far more important, perhaps he felt on his back the invisible whip of public opinion. Colonial
society hoped to reform the sinner by invoking the mockery and
scorn of his neighbors. Of course, everyone knew that a certain hard
core would not respond. These people were, first, clearly labeled as
the damned; and then, in the most aggravated cases, banished or put
to death. Kai Erickson has pointed out that branding marked a person "with the permanent emblem of his station in life." Branding
thus made it difficult to restore the offender to a normal social role.
Only serious offenders then, or repeaters, suffered this penalty. The
death penalty was infrequently used, but it also was an instrument
of education. Hanging was as public as whipping. The world could
observe the wages of sin.
The records of Kent County identified Andrew Mills and Adam
6. K. ERIKSON,
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Latham as laborers. Colonial society was nowhere democratic; indeed, no colonial society even pretended to such an ideal. Society was
stratified and hierarchical. To be sure, compared to England, great
numbers of people owned property and, therefore, made use of common law institutions and the political process. James A. Henretta,
in a study of colonial Boston, found 1,086 individuals in 1687 who
paid taxes on real estate or on their income from trade.7 The population of Boston was then roughly 6,000. Since children could hardly
be expected to own property and most wives were effectively outside
the economic system, landowners and tradesmen clearly constituted a
sizeable percentage of the people of colonial Boston and, therefore,
were customers for the tools and techniques of formal law.
At the bottom of the social pyramid were the landless laborers,
indentured servants, and, in the South, the mass of blacks held in
slavery. What the records make clear is that the weight of colonial
social control bore down most heavily upon this underclass. It was
not the merchant, landowner, or minister who was whipped in public, branded and set in the stocks. These were punishments for servants, laborers, and apprentices. The people who owned property, the
leaders and their willing followers defined what was the correct
morality. The criminal law enforced this code, upholding a moral
regime that the upper classes no doubt considered universal, but
which strained the human nature of their servants. Whatever its ethical base, the code had a cold-blooded function. It aimed to maintain
control over a work force on whose labor and obedience the community depended.
From the standpoint of the 20th century, crime and punishment
in the American colonies is remarkable because of its emphasis on
crimes against morality-particularly what we would now call victimless crimes. But to the colonists every crime had a victim: society.
In colonial Massachusetts, the man who blasphemed God, who was
idle, who failed to attend church, or who slept with a servant girl
was a criminal-and a sinner. He had to be punished in order to
preserve the moral order. The argument that these acts hurt nobody
would have puzzled and annoyed the good citizens of Massachusetts
Bay. The moral order was society; injury to one was injury to both.
7. Henretta, Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston, in
1 Nnw PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN PAST 83, 96 table 1 (S. Katz & S. Kutler
eds. 1969).
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Colonial social control was by no means unique in this regard.
Law and order take a similar form in small, face-to-face communities
which have clear lines of authority-explicit notions of who is on top
and who is on the bottom. Discipline in Massachusetts Bay was not
unlike discipline among schoolchildren. We note, for example, Wylie's
study of a village in France, where the usual way to punish a schoolchild was through shame-isolating him, and pitting the rest of society
against him. Teachers in the village consistently used "mocking criticism" to bring children into line. Sometimes they made a child kneel
at the wall, pressing his forehead against it, his hands folded on top of
his head. Or they made a child spend recess walking in a circle in the
schoolground, hands folded on his head, while other childem mocked.,
Derision, of course, is a common form of punishment; and, in stateless
societies an almost inevitable one.9 The criminal law of colonial society
used a common technique, then, when it invoked public opinion to
enforce the rules of moral order. These rules were a paramount concern of that small closely knit community.
The civil side of the law in colonial society also fit the needs and
demands of that particular social order. Colonial justice was open
and cheap. People did not hesitate to bring disputes to court, even
for rather petty claims. In 1639-40, in the Pynchon Court Record of
Western Massachusetts, we read of an "action of the Case for 3
boards;"' 1° and an action of debt for 2s 6d.1 In these small communities everyone knew who the judges were and where they could
be found. In colonial records we find thousands of small wills
processed, thousands of petty complaints, and thousands of local disputes. These show how low the threshold of access to court was, at
least in some colonies and in some periods of time. In this regard,
too, colonial courts were like the courts of preliterate societies or,
in some ways, like the neighborhood courts of Cuba and other socialist countries.' 2 In colonial society courts were inexpensive and at
8. L. WYLIE & A. BEGum, VILLAGE
9. See, e.g., J. REID, A LAW, OF
HOVEN,
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11. Id. at 209.
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everybody's door step. No affair was too petty for scrutiny. It was
a gossipy, ingrown society. People regularly brought disputes before
the courts. The courts settled them-admonishing, governing and
teaching. These traits differed, of course, from colony to colony. They
were, probably most pronounced in the early period and in the Puritan theocratic colonies. In these, law was bossy, parental, and moralistic; but (on the civil side) it was cheap and open of access as well.
In the 19th century the legal system changed dramatically. To
be sure, much of the formal criminal law was carried over from
colonial days. The statute books kept the old moral laws. Fornication,
adultery, and blasphemy were still crimes after the Revolution, as
they had been before. But this is only the surface; in reality, these
laws soon fell out of use. William E. Nelson studied criminal prosecutions in seven Massachusetts counties, between 1760 and 1774, at
the very end of the colonial period. He counted 2,784 prosecutions;
no less than 38 percent of these (an astonishing percentage) charged
sexual offenses, mostly fornication. Another 13 percent, 359 in all,
were for religious offenses-blasphemy, profanity and nonattendance
at church. 13 These figures confirm that the statutes were part of the
living law of the colony. But in the early 19th century, without major
change in the statutory base, the rate of prosecution for these crimes
declined almost to nothing. Criminal justice turned its attention to
crimes against property: crimes such as burglary and theft.
There is evidence that this lack of interest in crimes against
morality was generally felt. Francis Laurent carefully sifted the court
records of Chippewa County, Wisconsin. Between 1855 and 1894 he
found a total of five cases of incest, nine of adultery, four of fornication, and one of lewd and lascivious behavior-not much of a harvest
of sin. 14 Jack Williams studied crime and punishment in pre-Civil
War South Carolina, hardly a society without sinners; he found few
prosecutions for crimes against morality. Indictments for bastardy ran
13. W. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law During the Revolutionary Era 126-27, 1971 (unpublished thesis), as cited in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 63 (1973). In every fornication case except one (and 95 percent of
the sex cases were for fornication), the defendant was the mother of an illegitimate
child. Yet Nelson rejects the argument that fornication was punished merely because
it burdened towns with support of illegitimate children. He points out that prosecutions were brought even against mothers who had married their partners, and in cases
where there was no economic motive at all.
14. F. LAURENT, THE BUSINESS OF A TRIAL COURT 122 (1959).
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to about two percent of the total, but many of them were really cases
of nonsupport. Incest, bigamy, sodomy, and adultery hardly appeared
in court records. 15
One is welcome to believe, of course, that actual rates of fornication and blasphemy declined in this country in the 19th century.
This may be; but such dramatic declines are unlikely. What changed,
then, must have been a social factor, which affected the demand for
prosecution of victimless crimes, and which altered the system of
criminal justice. The secular, instrumental men of the 19th century
were less interested in the moral code as such, so long as infractions
wore a low profile. Colonial magistrates had wanted to build an ideal,
godly society. But in the 19th century wealth and opportunity were
recurrent themes in the writings (and presumably the thoughts) of
the elite and articulate. The task of law was to foster what J. Willard
Hurst has called "the release of individual creative energy."1 6 People
had "sighted the promise of a steeply rising curve of material productivity as the dynamic of a new kind of society"; 17 they had a "deep faith
in the social benefits to flow from a rapid increase in productivity." 18
Consequently, the main emphasis of the law shifted to the encouragement of economic activity, rather than enforcement of the ideal moral
code.
In any event the cozy colonial system of social control was no
longer possible. Society was larger, more mobile and transient; it was
busy with commercial affairs; rapid technological growth brought
constant novelty and complexity. Society was less able to entrust its
safety to stigma, shame, and the opinion of neighbors, particularly in
the industrial North. Hence, reformers of the 19th century no longer
saw society as cleansing and educating, as a hammer of reform and
retribution, or as the teacher and parent of men. Rather, as David
Rothman has argued, they saw society in a much more questionable
role. The peer group was, if anything, corrupting. Bad company, idleness and vice were ever present in society. A rotten environment was
ruinous to man. Everyone was "under siege .... Once, observers be15.
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lieved, neighbors had disciplined neighbors. Now, it seemed that
rowdies corrupted rowdies." 19
This was the age in which a new institution, the penitentiary,
was devised. In it, the deviant would be removed from society, to be
reshaped in a monastic, protected environment. Of course, the whipping post did not vanish overnight. It continued to be used, particularly in the South. Many states, such as South Carolina, still hung
incorrigibles in public; and people flocked on foot, on horseback,
sometimes even on special trains, to see the spectacle. 20 But more
and more, imprisonment became the standard punishment for serious
crimes.
The old style jails had been dirty, insecure and loosely run. The
new prison was radically different. To work reform, prisons had to be
redesigned. The two most famous of the early penitentiaries, Auburn
in New York and Cherry Hill in Pennsylvania, were both based on
the principles of solitude and silence. In Auburn (1821), the prisoners
slept alone at night in their cells. During the daytime they worked
together in a workshop, but were not allowed to talk to each other,
or even to look at their fellow inmates. Cherry Hill (1829) tried to
achieve even more radical isolation. Prisoners ate, worked and slept
in individual cells. Sometimes they wore masks. They listened to religious services through peepholes. They were utterly silent, utterly
alone.
The new penology burst like a bombshell in the world of social
thought. Foreign visitors, such as Beaumont and de Tocqueville, came
to study the penitentiary in its native habitat. On the whole, the two
Frenchmen were impressed by its rigor, its efficiency. 21 Charles
Dickens, who came a bit later, visited Cherry Hill and found it horrible: the prisoners seemed to him like men who were buried alive.
Isolation, he felt, was a mental torture worse than any "torture of
the body."2 Apparently, few of his peers saw things his way. Certainly contemporaries endlessly argued the merits of the two systems,
19. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 71.
20. J. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 101.
21. See G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (1833).

22. 0. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES
OF AMERICAN LAW 259-60 (1973).

109 (1900); see L. FRIEDUMAN,

A
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which to us today are as alike as Tweedledum and Tweedledee. But
23
all over the country, legislatures eagerly copied the one or the other.
In its pure state, the silent system could not and did not last.
To keep one man to a cell, in solitude, cost a good deal of money;
and the money was simply not forthcoming. Penitentiaries gradually
became mere prisons; the solitude and silence were surrendered except as a special punishment for troublemakers. By the time of the
Civil War even the famous penitentiaries, which had led the way,
often slept more than one man to a cell; and only a handful of
wardens still made a serious effort to enforce the regulation of
24
silence.
But the basic idea of the penitentiary flourished. Reformers believed that strict regimens, sermons, piety, loneliness and quiet would
regenerate a shattered soul. The average man probably rejected the
advanced views of the reformers, while agreeing that hard work, regimentation, a spartan life and long sentences were appropriate punishment for crime. Criminals were dangerous to society. They could not
be cured through stigma and shame. They, therefore, had to be removed from normal life. Those who were not to be hung or imprisoned forever would hopefully be cured of their tendencies. If not,
the prisoner was at least out of harm's way.
Victorian society has a reputation for prudery and sexual intolerance. American society was as prudish in language and official
behavior as the corresponding circles in England. Yet, as we saw, apparently nowhere did the law take seriously the job of enforcing the
sexual code. The law of divorce also illustrates the complex interaction between official morals and unofficial behavior. Divorce had always been difficult to get, rare and expensive. Absolute divorce was
not available at all in England, except through act of Parliament; 25
and in some Southern states before the Civil War divorce was equally
difficult and uncommon. 26 Yet in the North, a group of states dramatically relaxed their divorce laws. In Maine, by a law of 1849, any justice of the supreme judicial court could grant a divorce if he felt it
was "reasonable and proper, conducive to domestic harmony and
23. C. DICKENS, supra note 22, at 108.
24. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 242.
25. See Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PITT. L.
REv. 545 (1957).
26. See generally N. BLAKE, THE RoAD TO RENO (1962).
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peace, and consistent with the peace and morality of society." Connecticut, too, had an easy divorce law. 27 The divorce rate was very low
by modern standards, but some contemporaries still found it alarming
that there should be divorce at all or that divorce rates should rise.
Divorce, however, unlike" adultery or blasphemy, could not be
allowed to exist in a kind of moral underworld. There was a genuine
demand for it for social and economic reasons. For the sake of the
legitimacy of children, for security of property rights, for the right
to live legally with a second consort, divorce was an absolute necessity. Hence, the attack on easy divorce ultimately failed. But the easy
laws were repealed. They were replaced with tougher, more "moral"
laws-laws with a strong, healthy ethical surface-but the collusive
divorce and the Nevada divorce mills made the situation one of ex2
treme and blatant hypocrisy.
Yet the 19th century seemed to prefer, even to welcome, this
hypocrisy. By all accounts, throughout the century, particularly after
the first quarter of the century, there was a great deal of crime, brawling, drunkenness, gambling, and general hell-raising, just as one would
expect of normal human flesh. But a rather sharp line was drawn
between that which was officially allowed and that which was unofficially tolerated. This is the key, perhaps, to the strange fact already
noted: that the state stopped punishing fornication and other crimes
against morality, but never repealed the laws against these acts. This
may be the very heart of Victorian attitudes toward moral behavior.
What had to be preserved at all costs was the official code of strict
morality. What went on underneath was deplorable, but inevitable,
and in a curious way almost acceptable.
Evidence of the dark underbelly of Victorian life2 throws this
hypocrisy into high relief. Victorians on both sides of the Atlantic
published and read dirty books, cavorted with prostitutes, engaged in
buggery and every form of vice. They drank and gambled to excess.
But they seemed to take care not to sin in such a way as to threaten
the moral norms publically. A society can tolerate a great deal of
deviance, so long as the deviants do not attack the norms themselves,
but remain hidden in the woodwork. When deviants become what
27. Id. at 60-61.
28. Id. at 130-51.
29. See S. MARCUS,
IN THE BUD

(1969).
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Joseph Gusfield has called "enemy deviants," 30 that is, when they
attack the norms themselves and try to overthrow them, they represent
a greater (or at any rate a different) danger; and those who benefit
from the normative status quo, economically or spiritually, will react
repressively.
One such group of enemy deviants was the body of the Mormon
faithful, who insisted on practicing polygamy. Many people all over
the country were polygamists in fact if not in law. Yet, the Mormons
were open, defiant polygamists. A crusade against polygamy followed
whose savagery and shrillness can barely be imagined today.31
A kind of Victorian hypocrisy also characterized the whole of the
criminal law. On paper, every man was entitled to elaborate procedural
safeguards. He came to trial wearing the armor of the Bill of Rights;
he had a claim to a fair and speedy trial before a jury of his peers, and
scrupulous observance of the rules of the game. But during the century, the sheer volume of trials overwhelmed these rights. Society became more serious about catching and trying thieves and murderers.
Instead of amateur, haphazard methods of patrolling cities, after 1830
many cities turned to full-time professional police.-2 The police
themselves often ignored formal law and fought violence with its own
weapons. Masses of people were arrested and treated routinely, almost
cavalierly, in court. Rights were never formally relaxed. Upper courts
zealously combed the records of lower courts looking for errors. The
state renounced terror and torture as means to control the lower
classes. But, as far as we can tell, the lower courts and the enforcers,
particularly in the cities, ignored many of the formal rights. The population never accepted as an absolute good the official legal code. The
vigilantes in the West, lynch mobs in the South, and police brutality in
the cities all demonstrate over and over that, when the chips were
down and the situation serious enough, men inside and outside the
system were willing to take the law into their hands.
There was a similar hypocrisy in the civil part of law. American
law affected the work and welfare of great masses of people. In the
United States, land law was not a remote, aristocratic concern; mil30. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of
SOCIAL PROS. 175 (1968).
31. See T. O'DEA, THE MORMONS 41-75 (1957).
32. For an account of the origins and early years of two municipal police forces,
see R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY, BOSTON 1822-1885 (1967); J. RICHARDSON, THE
NEW YORK POLICE 23-51 (1970).
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lions dealt in the market, buying and selling land, moving about, getting and giving deeds, using mortgages, drawing up wills. Many borrowed money, or lent it out at interest; it was common to make, endorse, or accept bills and notes. Perhaps, compared to old Massachusetts, a rather lower percentage of the people directly confronted the
law. But, if commercial and land law did not touch the life and interest
of everyone, they did affect the life and interest of the vast middle
class.
To accommodate this mob of "consumers," to release latent economic energy, to maximize opportunity, society developed its law in
such a way as to make transactions both safe and efficient, that is, routine. The documents in use were redesigned to become simple, streamlined, and standard. Deeds shrank in size. Businessmen developed form
contracts to sell goods on the installment plan. These forms depended,
in a way, on the courts. The courts ratified the devices that businessmen developed-devices such as conditional sales, garnishments, and
chattel mortgages-and began to process them swiftly and efficiently.
At the same time, society seemed to feel that in a market economy the
legal system could not both promote efficiency and do strict, careful
justice between individual parties. Courts turned their back on what
in most societies is their primary and ordinary function-the settlement of disputes. They abandoned people to their own institutions
and devices. The law of a mass economy avoids individualization. It
reduces transactions to the typical, to the routine; it slices up some
small segment of reality and handles it in a standardized way. Behaviors are converted to legally relevant forms. A person pays his debts
by check-a piece of paper fixed in form and in legal meaning.
Routinization makes a good deal of sense. The work of society could
not proceed if judges had to stop to examine each little dispute in a
compulsive thoroughgoing way.
It is dangerous, of course, to attempt to read the minds of past
generations and generalize about what "society" thought. Yet one
senses in the 19th century a widely-held belief that it would be best if
people stayed out of court, tending their own affairs. Through law,
society established a basic framework, ensuring security to property
and contract. Inside this framework people were to do their jobs, getting and spending, making the wealth of the country grow. In American law and, so far as we can tell, in Western law in general, courts
gradually withdrew from the basic task of settling everyday disputes.
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One bit of evidence is the startling fact, suggested by data from a number of countries, that formal litigation tends not to keep pace with
population growth in the industrial nations. During an initial period
of expansion (perhaps because of the removal of restrictions left over
from the medieval past), the caseload rises; but with mature industrialization, the number of cases per 1,000 population turns static or
even declines. In England, where judicial statistics after 1850 are relatively good, the number of cases filed in court rose throughout the 19th
century-perhaps less, however, than one might expect. In the 20th
century, the trend reversed itself.33
In the long run, cost was an important monitor of the case loads
of courts. Litigation seems to have become more and more expensive.
High costs raise the threshold at which it makes sense for a person to
funnel disputes into court. Colonials litigated over pennies. Many matters got to court or were appealed that could appear today, if at all,
only in a small claims court.
Costs of litigation defy precise measurement, especially in the
past. The largest element, for example, is the lawyer's fee; but this
does not show on the face of the record. This fact itself is an interesting historical footnote. American courts do not award attorney's fees
to the winner of a lawsuit, as do the English. The American rule
seems to date from around

1850. 3

4

Supposedly, this rule was an his-

torical accident, but if so, it was a suspiciously convenient one. What
the rule does, of course, is raise the threshold of suit. Even a winning
party loses, unless damages cover the attorney's fee and then some.
The natural result of the American rule is to discourage small claims
and noneconomic causes of action.
Delays and overcrowding also raise the price of a lawsuit. Colonial
courts did their business quickly. They had no backlogs. Of course,
these were not mass societies. Great delays occur when judges and
staffs are inundated by the volume of cases. This happens in a society
with a huge population. But when one considers how economical it is
to run a system of justice, compared to schools, hospitals, highways, or
armies, one wonders why society was never willing to spend a few
33. See CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 19 (1972) (Comparative Table: Courts of
First Instance-Proceedings). An unpublished study of litigation rates in Spain by
Jose Juan Toharia shows similar results for recent decades, a period of rapid economic
growth in that country.
34. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 72 (1966).
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dollars more in order to expand the system and meet growing needs.
One senses a feeling, implicit no doubt, that a logjam in court is not
all to the bad. It discourages litigation. Then too, the country has
allowed its lawyers to unionize (as it were), raising standards and
fees; it has refused to subsidize litigation, and it has made, until recently, only feeble attempts to provide cheap justice for the poor.85
Most important of all, perhaps, is the nature of law itself: Legal
rules and procedures are impersonal and remote, dryly technical, forbidding. Law in the urban, industrial countries is very different from
law in small societies. Legal and social norms are much the same in
small societies; everybody knows a lot of law since it is nothing
special to know.36 Colonial law had some smattering of this aspect.
The law was technical in detail, but in broad outline it spoke an
everyday language. 37 A high degree of technicality will inevitably discourage litigation. If justice is mysterious, if law resembles a lottery,
people will be unwilling to take a chance even if they feel morally
secure in their cause. An unpredictable outcome is a high cost, high
risk result.
All these factors create a zone of behavior which one might call
a "zone of reciprocal immunity."3 8 Landlord and tenant sign a lease
agreement. The tenant promises not to play his radio loud or late at
night., The landlord promises to keep the outside stairway in repair.
Each violates a little. Because litigation is costly, because there is no
neighborhood court, because justice is risky, far-off, and expensive, each
is in a way immune from legal attack, at least for these minor infractions. They must settle the matter themselves.
On the whole, a system of reciprocal immunities may be quite
functional in a society of our type. We do not want people running to
court at the drop of a hat. But this sort of system produces severe and
dangerous side effects. Compared with other societies and other periods, Western legal systems have removed the bulk of the population
from any voluntary contact with the courts. The system of immunities on the whole favored business over private citizens; it was,
35. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, J. HowARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE

POOR (1967).
36. See, e.g., S. SCHLEGEL, TiRuRAY JUSTICE 163 (1970).

37. On this point, see W. Nelson, supra note 13.
38. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV.
786, 806 (1967); see M. Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead 17 n.29, August,
1973 (unpublished paper on file
at the Buffalo Law Review office).
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therefore, itself a device of allocation. The 19th century, practically
speaking, denied justice to the poor and the powerless. Redress of
grievances through law was distinctly abnormal. There may have been,
in absolute terms, a tremendous volume of litigation. But the man in
the street did not use courts to adjust his problems or settle his
disputes. The average man was left alone, separated from whatever
wisdom, understanding, and justice may inhere in the formal principles
of law.
Nor was the situation of the lower middle class much better. The
courts did not and could not reach out for the business of the common
man even if he were an entrepreneur of sorts. It may be that courts
in urban, market societies simply cannot play the role that a tribal or
village court plays. American courts, however, never tried, though a
certain number of schemes helped patch the system up, helped mitigate some of the most severe defects of justice.
Many scholars, looking at the legal system in the first part of the
19th century, have come away impressed with a sense of economic
optimism. Obviously, many things were palpably wrong with the
country. A gigantic failure to solve problems of region and race
brought on the great Civil War. Cycles of boom and bust destroyed
thousands of homes, businesses, farms, and fortunes. Yet overall, people
believed that America was a land of opportunity, that in the long run
economic horizons would constantly expand, that the stock of national
wealth would grow larger and larger. Here, then, was a second period
of American justice-a period of rapid growth in society and rapid
change in law. Criminal justice and civil justice alike ceased to be
concerned with the individual as such. Rather, they became responsive
to the socioeconomic needs of the society (as courts and legislatures
interpreted these) through routinization of transactions on the civil
side, and through foutinization and professionalization of law enforcement, the penitentiary system, and the stressing of the protection of
property rather than morality on the criminal side.
The age of optimism did not last forever. By the end of the 19th
century it seemed to have come to an end, and a new, third period
can be said to have begun. A sense of crisis, a kind of darkening of
mood, seemed to seize the country. Concrete social change underlay
this shift in the climate of opinion. Much of the population lived in
big cities, which seemed more and more rotten, filthy, crime-ridden,
ugly, crowded, and corrupt. People deserted the wholesome life of
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farms and small towns for the dreary life of factories and slums. New
inventions and techniques made life healthier, but somehow complicated it beyond the grasp of the average man. The frontier passed
away. There was no more free land at the end of the rainbow. Never
mind the question of how real the frontier had been, how much
of an outlet it was for American energies. It was the symbol of unlimited opportunity, and by 1890 or 1900 it was gone. By this time
many in the middle class felt that something vital had disappeared
from American life. There was no longer room in the economy for
everyone; social life was a struggle for survival. What one gained, another lost. The economy could not expand forever. The spectre of
class struggle hung over the nation. Interest groups jockeyed for power
and position, more blatantly than before. 30
A certain paranoia set in on the subject of race. This was the period of lynch law and the furor over the so-called yellow peril. At one
time the country had welcomed immigrants. The country wanted
settlers and workers. Immigrants would create a demand for land
and commodities; land values would rise and the economy would
gain. Of course, people had in mind only a certain kind of immigrant.
When others took the welcome sign too literally, nativist reaction
developed. The debates over the Chinese at the California Convention
of 1878-79 make hair-raising reading: one speaker denounced the
Chinese as "moon-eyed lepers"; speaker after speaker expressed fear
of cheap coolie labor. The Chinese would destroy white civilization
and pauperize the people of California: "If clover and hay be planted
upon the same soil, the clover will ruin the hay, because clover lives
upon less than the hay; and so it is in this struggle between the races.
The Mongolian race will live and run the Caucasian race out." 40 John
R. Commons felt that immigrants from northwestern Europe-Germans and Scandinavians-were from the start the model farmers of
America; they had qualities of thrift and self-reliance and pursued intensive agriculture. 41 The Jewish immigrant on the other hand was
"unfitted for the life of a pioneer."42 Commons drew a line between
the "thrifty, hard-working and intelligent American or Teutonic
39. L.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 295-99.
40. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STA'rE OF CALIFORNIA 700, 704 (1881).
41. J. COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA

42. Id.

133 (1913).
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farmer," and the "backward, thriftless and unintelligent races," who
worked best "in gangs in large estates." 43 "Races wholly incompetent
as pioneers and independent proprietors are able to find a place when
once manufactures, mines and railroads have sprung into being, with
their captains of industry to guide and supervise their semi-intelligent work."4 Attitudes such as these helped mold a body of immigration law that became more and more restrictive and complex. The
first step was to exclude the Chinese. Ultimately, the federal government put sharp limits on entry and adopted a quota system in 1924.
The quotas discriminated, of course, against the "incompetent races. '45
It is particularly interesting to note in the history of immigration
law how fear of the effect of immigrants on the economy is mingled
with moral or cultural horror. Both motives were behind the movement to exclude the less-favored immigrants. Perhaps the economic
mood caused the moral mood; perhaps the lines of causality ran the
other way around. At any rate, by the turn of the century millions
were displeased with the national prospects. Industrialism was a monster that had run amuck. The mobs of "incompetent races" who
flooded the country only stimulated the growth of this monster and,
in the process, drove down the wage rate. Tremendous industrial combines were forming. Small businessmen, farmers and merchants
trembled in fear of their power. Today, fear of the "trusts" seems as
overwrought as fear of Chinese workers. But in the days of the Sherman Act, passed in 1890,46 the fears were certainly real and in deadly
47

earnest.

Naturally, each major concern bred a mass of new law. In the
struggle for existence, the power of the state was one of the most useful
of weapons. In the late 19th century, economic interest groups multiplied in number. The urge to organize stemmed, at least in part, from
the natural feeling that in union there was additional strength; and
strength was sorely needed in difficult times. The interest groups
fought each other in the marketplace and occasionally on the streets,
but primarily in the halls of the legislatures. Unions,' for example,
43. Id. at 132.
44. Id. at 133-34.

45. See G. STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 1820-1924, at
170-92 (1926).
46. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1973)).
47. See W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 54-71 (1965).
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wanted legitimacy for their tactics; and when those tactics failed, they
wanted to win through law what they could not gain through bargaining and fighting with management.
This was only one instance of the use of law to achieve organizational aims. Occupational licensing was another. Doctors, lawyers, barbers, plumbers, nurses and accountants lobbied for licensing laws.
Licensing was a way to give control of a trade group to itself, along
with the power to keep out the marginals and support the prices and
prestige of the members. A whole array of occupations, ministering
human wants from cradle to grave (from midwives to morticians and
embalmers), asked for and got the right to be licensed. Even coal
miners were briefly licensed in Illinois. 48 The form was novel, the
concept was not. In general, workers joined unions, farmers joined
farm organizations, businesses belonged to trade associations and
formed combines. The middle class trades licensed themselves." 9
Along with the economic struggle raged a fight for normative
domination. The Victorian solution slowly broke down. Deviant
minorities burst into public view, bringing uneasiness and pain to the
moral majorities. The process was, and is, slow and complex. Frequently, the moral majorities fought back. When deviants openly defied them, they had no choice but to repress--or else surrender their
claims to moral superiority. Consequently, after a long period of relative quiet, a number of dead moral laws seemed to spring into life, and
new laws on similar subjects were passed. Sometimes the motives
seemed mainly economic. Toward the end of the century, the Sunday
laws were the focus of enforcement campaigns in many cities. Labor
strongly supported these laws. They wanted to win a shorter work
week for their members, and Sunday laws were a useful means to that
end.5" But ministers and preachers were their willing accomplices;
labor and religion formed an odd but understandable coalition. Arguably, Sunday laws were all show and hypocrisy-economic laws masquerading as moral legislation. But probably the moral disguise which
the economic motives wore was not wholly lacking in meaning. If the
48. Act of June 1, 1908, [1908] Laws of Ill. 90.
49. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1900, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1965).
50. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 511-12; see, e.g., Act of May 25, 1897, ch.
188, [1897] Laws of Conn. 883. Of course, Sunday laws had been enforced off and on
throughout the qentury. For some glimpses of this complex history, see W. JOHNS,
DATELINE SUNDAY, U.S.A. (1967).
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concept of a Sunday full of harmony and rest had had no power of persuasion, the unions could not have put together a coalition with the
religious.
Many other signs of a resurgent moral militancy appeared at the
end of the 19th century. The federal government crushed interstate
traffic in lotteries in 1895.,1 The temperance movement became
stronger and ultimately achieved a disastrous success. Joseph Gusfield,
for one, interprets the temperance struggle as a struggle for normative
dominance, a struggle to show the "superior power and prestige of the
old middle class in American society." 52 In the early 20th century, some
states even tried to ban the cigarette. One of these states was Arkansas,
which, in 1907, made it a crime to make, sell or give away cigarettes
or cigarette papers to anyone, child o"adult.53 In the same year, Arkansas prohibited betting on horse races4 and passed a law against
malicious disturbance of church congregations by "profanely swearing, or using indecent gestures," violence, or any "language" or act
which would "disquiet, insult or interrupt said congregation." 55 This
period too had the honor of ushering in a crusade against drugs and addiction. Arthur Conan Doyle described how Sherlock Holmes, as one
author has put it, "relaxed at the Baker Street flat after his bouts
with Professor Moriarity by summoning Dr. Watson to prepare him
a needle." 50 There was little or no opprobrium attached. Troy Duster
has written that in 1900, "[a]nyone could go to his corner druggist and
buy grams of morphine or heroin for just a few pennies. There was
no need to have a prescription ... no moral stigma attached to such
narcotics use." 57 Within 20 years, the law savagely proscribed the addict, who was now labeled a dope fiend; secere federal and state sanctions were imposed, and the country embarked on the dubious
adventure of trying to stamp out drug use through repressive measures.
Finally, in 1910, another nightmare or fantasy of a beleagured moral
51. Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. § 1301 (1970)). Lotteries, common in the early part of the century, were
outlawed in many states. See J. EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL (1960).
52. 3.GUSFIELD, THE SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 122 (1963). See generally D. PWiAR,
Puarry CRUSADE (1973).
53. Act of May 8, 1907, No. 280, [1907] Acts of Ark. 653.
54. Act of February 27, 1907, No. 55, [1907] Acts of Ark. 134.
55. Act of May 9, 1907, No. 287, [1907] Acts of Ark. 682.
56. R. KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP 17 (1972).
57. T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 3 (1969).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

majority gave rise to the Mann Act, which outlawed "white slavery."'S
We are paying a heavy price for some of these nightmares. Arguably, prohibition created a generation of lawbreakers, unwittingly
vested immense power in gangsters, corrupted officials, and distorted
the administration of justice.5 9 Similar charges are leveled at the modern enforcement of drug laws.
More hopeful and productive was another breach of the Victorian
compromise. This was the revolt of the underdogs themselves-the
refusal of the downtrodden to accept their labels. It included the insistence of moral minorities on the right to their own view of life,
not secretly, but de jure, right up front. This revolution is quite recent.
It has been influenced strongly by the example of the civil rights movement, which is in one sense as old as slavery, but in another sense distinctly a product of the 20th century. Some might think that to put
under one roof the civil rights movement and the revolt against moral
taboos (obscenity, blasphemy, and non-Biblical behavior in bed)
trivializes the struggle for racial equality. But this much is held in
common: unwillingness to abide by Victorian arrangements. These
were arrangements made with the expectation that the lower orders
-"lower" in the social, economic, and also the moral sense-would
more or less stay in their place.
Numerous devices fastened down the Victorian arrangements,
and convenient ideologies and myths buttressed them. It is not the
purpose of this paper to examine this subject in detail. However, some
of the myths and ideologies might be mentioned. One was equality
before the law. Obviously inequality was rife, not to mention corruption, but a system of beliefs justified or excused inequalities. Among
these was the belief that the United States was a country of great social
mobility. Most influential was the notion that nothing much could be
done to redistribute power and wealth without ruining the countrythat is, nothing which was radical or required active state action.
Economists and their popular spokesmen told the country that only
disaster could result from interference with natural laws. No one
believed this entirely, but enough people believed it enough to keep
the country politically calm-at least for a while. But faith in the invisible hand lasted only as long as the optimism of the formative
58. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. § 2421 (1966)).
59. A. SINCLAM, ERA OF EXCESS 178-219 (1964).
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period. When the hand dealt bad cards, the players began to cheat.
This ushered in the age of the pressure groups.
Whatever the causes, 20th-century man seems less inclined to
accept the social order as a given and his place within it as fixed. He
demands for himself, his interests, and his aspirations, recognition and
legitimacy, as well as practical achievement. There is, consequently,
a massive demand to close the gap between the official surface of the
law and the reality. Already in the late 19th century, devices to
improve the administration of justice and access to the law had developed; the pace of these changes quickened in the 20th century.
The law of obscenity provides us an excellent example. Pornography itself was centuries old.The first amendment to the Constitution
-and a rather strong national tradition-protects freedom of speech.
Yet no one in the 19th century imagined for a moment that "free
speech" included hard core pornography. Pictures and descriptions
of sex were taboo, except for medical and scientific purposes, or behind
a screen of euphemism. Nudity on the stage or in live sex shows was
out of the question. There was no demand for these entertainments,
no test cases; the idea was simply unthinkable. The United States
Supreme Court did not decide an obscenity case until after the Second
World War.60 This first case dealt with Edmund Wilson's novel,
Memoirs of Hecate County. The Court divided equally. Not even a
Bible-belt schoolmarm would blink at the book today, with the Kama
Sutra and Lady Chatterly in every drug store, to mention only the
mildest examples. Since 1948, the law has amazingly expanded the
public zone of sexual expression-what can be said, seen, touched, felt,
and done in the open. Whether there is a similar explosion of sexual
behavior is much less clear. No doubt behavior has changed and will
change further, but the initial and more dramatic change is in the
balance between licit and illicit, between what is flaunted and what is
hidden. Indeed, one of the best examples of the new permissiveness is
John Cleland's book, Memoirs of a Lady of Pleasure,commonly called
Fanny Hill, written in the late 18th century but safely underground
until about 10 years ago. The question whether Fanny Hill is obscene
60. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (per curiam), aff'g
297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947). The next obscenity case did not come before the
Court until almost 10 years later. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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has been adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court itself; 0 ' it
goes without saying that never before in its two hundred years would
this book have dared show its face in public. Yet a market for pornography existed in 1800, 1850, and 1900. There were people who wanted
to read Fanny Hill, and who were willing to pay for a copy. What was
lacking was an appreciable demand on the law to legitimate that
market. People were content to remain underground in their lechery,
or resigned to this fate. There were deviants, but not enemy deviants.
What does this history suggest? Law, we have said, is a kind of
map of interests and demands. Its structure and substance betray
current conceptions of law and current concepts of the legitimate
limits of law. Law reflects the agenda of controversy-the things that
are in actual dispute. It also gives strong negative evidence about
which issues are not in dispute, the things that nobody questions.
The issues in dispute are demands and counterdemands. When we
speak of a crisis in law, civil or criminal, we mean a crisis in demands.
Clearly, in the third and present period, which began roughly a century ago, two distinct pressures on law have produced such a "crisis."
First, the oppressed and the deviant have demanded legitimization;
second, counterpressure has developed from the old majorities, whose
moral and economic dominance has been threatened.
The current agitation about law and order-crime in the streetsis a meeting ground or battlefield of these two armies, pushing
against the legal structure from opposite sides. Most people assume
that crime is rampant in the cities; a walk in the streets after dark
is perilous. Also widespread is the idea that life in the cities is rotten
and corrupt, and getting worse. This, of course, is not a new idea.
The bad reputation of the cities is centuries old. But there seems to
be an increase now, a stridency in the fears and demands of broad
masses of people.
Yet in the face of this clamor, some scholars flatly proclaim that
the crime wave is a myth. Over the long haul, they say, violent crime
has, if anything, declined in the cities.6 2 Urban crime may have
jumped, but only in the last few years, and even that is disputed. New
61. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
62. See D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 151 (1962); Lane, Urbanization and
Criminal Violence in the 19th Century, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 468, 469 (H.
Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969).
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York and other big cities, it is argued, were hot beds of crime in
1870 to a much greater extent than today.
If so, then what is the crisis in crime? First of all, it is possible
that something real has happened to the crime rate. People care less
about raw numbers of crimes than about the kinds of crime, who
commits what acts, in what places, how, and to whom. It is one thing
for crime to run rampant where the middle class never penetrates, in
places it cares nothing about; but it is quite another thing for those
same crimes to be committed in a city in which everyone is interdependent and within striking distance of one another. This is the condition of cities in a mass society, with mass mobility, and in which slums
gird the core of the city. The "dangerous classes" 63 once lived in tight
districts, out of sight and almost out of mind. Now no place is safe.
The paths of those who live in the slums cross the paths of the rich
64
on their way to work, theaters, restaurants, and banks.
Much violence in the past took place outside the cities. In a raw
frontier community, a Dodge City let us say, grown men committed
violent crimes-many of them on other grown men. What horrifies
,people today is violence committed on the helpless and the innocent.
When an addict murders an 80-year-old widow, the statistic is the same
as when one gunfighter shoots down another. Socially, however, the
two crimes are quite different. In one case victim and killer stand
on an equal footing. Both entered a violent world, more or less of
their own free will. In the other case, the relationship is involuntarya relationship of predator and prey.
Even so, the crisis in law is a crisis of demand. Whether or not
conditions have gotten worse in the outside world, the tolerance level
has certainly declined, and cQrrelatively, the level of demand that
something be done has risen. The demand for an attack on crime is
a demand for sterner police measures, tougher prisons, less "permissiveness." It is tied-not logically but emotionally-to fear and hatred
of the moral minorities and of the unruly and political factions of the
underprivileged. The demands of these people have brought about
great improvements in access to law and in the administration of
justice. Demand now meets counterdemand of equal or almost equal
63. See C. BRACE, THE DANGEROUS
YEARS WORK AMONG THEM (3d ed. 1880).
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strength. There is no obvious short-run solution to the clash of these
sets of demands.
The third period, then-our period-is a period of conflict
and struggle in the two specific areas we have stressed. There has always been conflict and struggle, but the current forms seem particularly nasty and sharp. This is because the moral world appears to have
lost some of its classical shock absorbers. The unshakeable faith of the
colonial elites is gone. The 19th century was fortified by faith in economic growth and a basic stock of moral principles. Now old compromises and accommodations have lost much of their strength. Opposing forces are struggling, not only for power, but also for legitimacy; and legitimacy is not easy to share. No doubt there will be new
accommodations and new compromises; but their shapes and sizes, at
least for now, are not visible to the naked eye.

